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Abstract
A one-way coupled spatiotemporally chaotic map lattice is used to contruct cryptosystem. With
the combinatorial applications of both chaotic computations and conventional algebraic operations,
our system has optimal cryptographic properties much better than the separative applications
of known chaotic and conventional methods. We have realized experiments to pratice duplex
voice secure communications in realistic Wired Public Switched Telephone Network by applying
our chaotic system and the system of Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), respectively, for
cryptography. Our system can work stably against strong channel noise when AES fails to work.
Keywords: Spatiotemporal chaos; Chaotic cryptography; Error function attack
PACS numbers: 05.45.Vx, 05.45.Ra, 43.72.+q
1
I. INTRODUCTION
Chaotic systems have several significant features favorable to secure communications, such
as aperiodicity (useful for one-time pad cipher); sensitivity to initial condition and parame-
ters (useful for effective bit confusion and diffusion [1]); and random-like behavior (useful for
producing output with satisfactory statistics). With all these advantages scientists expected
to introduce new and powerful tools of chaotic cryptography [2–7]. Nevertheless, during the
last decade, many pitfalls and drawbacks of cryptosystems based on chaos synchronization
have been found. The main problems are: low security due to easy reconstruction of chaotic
dynamics [8–12], slow performance speed due to analytical floating-point computation, and
weak resistance against channel noise due to large bit error propagation caused by finite
chaos synchronization time. Recently, various methods have been suggested to solve the
above problem [13–17]. In this paper we propose to use a one-way coupled chaotic map
system to construct a cryptosystem with optimal overall properties. The crucial merits
of this system are: on one hand we use spatiotemporal chaos to fully apply and develop
the advantages of chaotic cryptography, and on the other hand we incorporate some simple
algebraic operations in the conventional cryptography to overcome the disadvantages of ana-
lytical chaotic computations. With the combinative applications of chaotic and conventional
methods our system has optimal cryptographic properties much better than the separative
applications of chaotic and conventional methods known so far. We design an experiment
set with embedded CPUs and use this set to practice duplex voice secure communications in
realistic wired Public Switched Telephone Network, by applying our chaotic cryptosystem
and the system of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [18], respectively, for compar-
isons. Experimental and numerical results show that our system is considerably better than
AES with both security and performance speed. Most significantly, our system can work
stably against strong channel noise when AES fails to work.
II. SPATIOTEMPORAL CHAOTIC CRYPTOSYSTEM (STCC)
We take a one-way coupled map lattice for spatiotemporal-chaos-based cryptography,
which has the encryption transformation as
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xn+1(j) = (1− ε)fj [xn(j)] + εfj [xn(j − 1)],
fj(x) = (3.75 + aj/4)x(1− x), aj ∈ [0, 1],
j = 1, · · · , m (1a)
xn(0) = Dn/2
9 + 0.1
xn+1(m+ 1) = (1− ε)f [xn(m+ 1)] + εf [xn(m)],
Q′n = [int(xn(m+ 1)× 2
52)] mod 232 (1b)
Qn = Sbox(Q
′
n)
f(x) = 4x(1− x), zn = Qn/2
32
xn+1(m+ 2) = (1− ε)f1[xn(m+ 2)] + εf1(zn),
xn+1(j) = (1− ε)fj−m−1[xn(j)]
+εfj−m−1[xn(j − 1)], (1c)
j = m+ 3, · · · , 2m+ 1
xn+1(j) = (1− ε)f [xn(j)] + εf [xn(j − 1)], (1d)
j = 2m+ 2, · · · , 2m+ 2N
yn+1(1, 1) = (1− ε)f [yn(1, 1)] + εf [xn(2m+ 2N)]
yn+1(j1, 1) = (1− ε)f [yn(j1, 1)]
+
ε
2
{f [yn(j1 − 1, 1)] + f [xn(2m+ 2j1 − 1)]}
yn+1(1, j2) = (1− ε)f [yn(1, j2)]
+
ε
2
{f [yn(1, j2 − 1)] + f [xn(2m+ 2j2 − 2)]} (1e)
yn+1(j1, j2) = (1− ε)f [yn(j1, j2)]
+
ε
2
{f [yn(j1, j2 − 1)] + f [yn(j1 − 1, j2)]}
j1, j2 = 2, 3, · · · , N
3
Kn(j1, j2) = int[yn(j1, j2)× 2
52] mod 232,
Sn = [Kn(j1, j2) + In(j1, j2)] mod 2
32,
j1, j2 = 1, 2, · · · , N (1f)
Dn = [Sn(N,N)≫ 24]&255
where the S-box is defined as
A1 = [(Q
′
n ≫ 24)&255], A2 = [(Q
′
n ≫ 16)&255],
A3 = [(Q
′
n ≫ 8)&255], A4 = [(Q
′&255],
A0 = A1 ⊕A2 ⊕ A3 ⊕ A4 (2)
Qn = [A0 ≪ 24] + [A4 ≪ 16] + [A3 ≪ 8] + A2
The operation x ≫ y (x ≪ y) denotes a right (left) shift of x by y bits, the & operator is
bitwise AND, and ⊕ means bitwise XOR.
The decryption system is driven by the transmitted signal as
x′n(0) = Dn/2
9 + 0.1
and all other dynamic forms of the receiver are exactly the same as those of the transmitter
with xn(j), zn, yn(j1, j2), Kn(j1, j2), In(j1, j2), and a = (a1, a2, · · · , am) replaced by x
′
n(j),
z′n, y
′
n(j1, j2), K
′
n(j1, j2), I
′
n(j1, j2), and b = (b1, b2, · · · , bm), respectively. With b = a, the
receiver can reach chaos synchronization with the transmitter, and successfully recover the
true plaintext as
b = a, y′n(j1, j2) = yn(j1, j2),
K ′n(j1, j2) = Kn(j1, j2), I
′
n(j1, j2) = In(j1, j2) (3)
In Eqs.(1)-(3) three parameters ε, m, N are adjustable for controlling different cryptographic
properties of the system, according to the actual requirements of realistic secure communi-
cations. In this paper, we fix
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ε = 0.99, m = 3, N = 4 (4)
and will simply call our spatiotemporally chaotic cryptosystem Eq.(1) with parameters (4)
as STCC. The scheme of STCC is shown in Fig.1, and the decryption system has exactly
the same structure with feedback structure of the transmitter replaced by driving structure
in the receiver. The former is thus a high-dimensional hyperchaos while the latter becomes
nonchaotic with all conditional Lyapunov exponents negative.
The important and new point of system (1) is that we apply both floating-point ana-
lytical computation of spatiotemporal chaos and algebraic operations of integer numbers to
construct our cryptosystem which possess the advantages of both chaotic and conventional
cryptographies.
First, we use high-dimensional spatiotemporal chaos as the basic structure of the cryptog-
raphy, which leads to the following significant advantages. (i) Due to the high-dimensionality
and chaoticity, the output keystreams and ciphertexts have high complexity, long periodicity
of computer realization of chaos, and effective bit confusion and diffusion in many directions
in the variable space. All these properties are favorable to achieve high practical security
[17]. (ii) Due to the extended nature of STCC we are able to use many sites (N ×N = 16
square sites in Fig.1) to produce keystreams in parallel and greatly increase the speed of
performance [6]. (iii) With one-way coupled maps and strong coupling (1 − ε ≪ 1), the
receiver can easily reach chaos synchronization with the transmitter by a single driving Dn.
Note, for each iteration the driving Dn has only 8 bits while the total ciphertext 512 bits.
This separation of driving bits from nondriving ciphertext bits makes the communication
well resistant against strong channel noise. This point will be the central focus later in our
experiment.
After the above advantages of STCC, the following algebraic operations of Eq.(1) can fur-
ther and greatly improve the cryptographic properties of the system. (i) In Eq.(1f) we apply
an algebraic operation int, which makes all keystreams Kn(j1, j2), ciphertext Sn(j1, j2), and
driving signal Dn integer numbers. These integralizations are extremely important for the
robustness of highly secure communications against computer round-off errors and channel
noise [14]. (ii) In Eqs.(1b) and (1f) we apply modulo operations [13, 16], which can con-
siderably enhance the key sensitivity of the system, and can also effectively improve the
random-like statistics of the transmitted signals. (iii) In Eqs.(1b) and (2) we incorporate
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a S-box algebraic operation [17], which makes any analytical solution aiming at exposing
the secret key extremely difficult. All the algebraic operations (i)-(iii) have been popu-
larly used in the conventional cryptography. These operations are so simple that they need
very low computational expenses; and so weak that they cannot play significant role in the
conventional cryptography by themselves. However, incorporating with the analytical com-
puterization of STCC, these simple algebraic operations play important roles in optimizing
the cryptographic properties of the system, because they are just suited, with very little
cost, to overcome the weakness of chaotic cryptography mentioned in the introduction and
allow the advantages of STCC fully developed.
III. CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROPERTIES OF STCC
We have evaluated various cryptographic properties of system (1). Specifically, we have
analyzed in details its security, performance, and robustness, and compared these properties
with those of AES. It is found that STCC is considerably better than AES in all the above
essential aspects.
(A) Security
We have evaluated the security of STCC by trying various effective attacks based on key-
sensitivity analysis; statistical-property analysis; and analytical-solution analysis with the
conditions of public-structure and known plaintext, and find that no any tested method can
be more effective than the brute force attack. The detail of these evaluations (in particular,
the atatistics-based evaluations) will appear elsewhere [17]. In this paragraph we focus on
the key sensitivity analysis by using the error function attack [16].
Since we consider public-structure and plaintext-known attacks, any intruder can run
the receiver system with the test key b to produce I ′n(j1, j2), and then compare the output
I ′n(j1, j2) with the true plaintext In(j1, j2) for exposing the location of a. Specifically, the
intruder can compute the following error function
e(j1, j2;b) =
1
T
T∑
n=1
|i′n(j1, j2)− in(j1, j2)| (5)
in(j1, j2) =
In(j1, j2)
232
, i′n(j1, j2) =
I ′n(j1, j2)
232
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The secret key a can be extracted by minimizing the error function as
e(j1, j2;b) = 0 at b = a (6)
This evaluation is called as the error function attack (EFA), which can be used to analyze
the key sensitivity property of the system.
In Figs.2(a) and (b) we fix b2 = b3 = a1 = a2 = a3 = 0.5 and plot e(1, 1; b1) vs b1 with
T = 108 for different detect resolutions. It is clearly shown that e(1, 1; b1) raises rapidly
to 1
3
with very small fluctuation for extremely small mismatch |b1 − a1| ≥ 2
−45. The same
behavior can be observed as well for b2 and b3. In Fig.(2c) we fix b3 = a3 = 0.5 and plot
e(1, 1; b1, b2) vs b1 and b2, and observe a needle-like basin exactly at b1 = a1, b2 = a2. In
Fig.2(d) we present the behavior of e(1, 1;b) in the 3D parameter space. It is shown again
that whenever |b− a| ≥ 2−45 in the 3D space, the error function raises immediately to
about 1
3
. Therefore, the effective key number of our system against EFA is (245)3 = 2135. It
can be easily proven that two data sequences, completely uncorrelated and purely random
and uniformly distributed in [0,1], have error value of Eq.(5) equal to 1
3
. The behavior of
Figs.2(a)-(d) show convincingly excellent key-parameter-sensitivity and satisfactory random-
like statistical properties. The cost for the intruder to break the security of our system by
using EFA is quantitated as
Cost = 2135 ≈ 1040 (7)
which is also the cost of the brute force attack for the 2135 key number.
Chaotic system (1) has a significant advantages over AES with security. The security
level of system (1) can be conveniently and greatly increased. Simply increasing m in Eq.(4)
by one, we can surely enlarge the key number (i.e., the level of security) by 245 times, with
the cryptographic structure of Eq.(1) kept unchanging and with almost no increase (about
5% increase) of computational cost. Thus, the security of STCC is practically unshakable
by the quick technology advance of attack machines, including possible future quantum
computers. In comparison, in order to greatly increase the security level of AES, some other
cryptographic properties have to be sacrificed in balance.
(B) Encryption (decryption) speed
Usually, the floating-point analytical computation of real variables used in chaotic cryp-
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tography is considerably slower than the algebraic operations of integer numbers used in
conventional cryptography. The encryption speed of the former is thus often not compara-
ble with that of the latter when the securities of both systems are comparable. Nevertheless,
STCC has rather fast speed, because it fully takes the advantages of spatiotemporal chaos
in performance. By keeping high security, STCC produces ciphers in every iteration (one-
round encryption structure), and meanwhile in each iteration many [4 × 4 = 16 for Eq.(4)]
sites make encryption operations in parallel. Therefore, with software implementation our
STCC has very high speed, higher than AES (which, with key of 128 bits, takes 10 rounds
for producing ciphers of a block). Specifically our STCC can encrypt 914Mbit and 430Mbit
per second with 2GHz (A) and 700MHz (B) CPU computers, respectively, while AES (with
128-bit key length and 128-bit block length) produces 267Mbit and 96Mbit ciphers for the
same computers. STCC is therefore faster than AES for 3.4 and 4.4 times with computers
A and B, respectively.
A crucial point for the validity of the parallel encryption operations in Fig.1 is that all
the keystreams produced by the 16 square sites should be practically uncorrelated from each
other. We checked this point and found that these keystreams are uncorrelated from each
other and insuppressible indeed, and this validates the parallel encryptions of Eq.(1) and
Fig.1.
(C) Robustness of communications against channel noise
With the extremely high sensitivity shown in Fig.2, the problem of robustness and relia-
bility of secure communication against computer round-off errors and channel noise should
be carefully examined. It is well known that all block-cipher systems and stream-cipher
systems with self-synchronizing scheme have a problem of bit error propagation (or say, bit
error avalanche), i.e., one bit error in the driving signal may cause a large number of error
bits in the received plaintext. In this regard, STCC has some essential advantages. The
most significant feature of our system is that among the ciphers of 512 bits produced in
each iteration [Sn(j1, j2), j1, j2 = 1, 2, 3, 4 ] only 8 bits (Dn) are used for driving. Therefore,
only 1
64
transmitted bits (driving bits) have bit error avalanche problem, and all other bits
(nondriving ciphertext bits) have not. Hence, in average the avalanche destruction can be
considerably reduced in our case. In order to reduce the avalanche effect people must include
some additional bits for protection of the driving signal, and this increases the cost of both
cryptography and signal transmission. In doing so our STCC has a great advantage over
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AES because in AES one should protect all transmitted bits (each error bit of the ciphertext
has an equal error avalanche of 128 bits in the receiver plaintext) while for our system only
the driving bits, i.e., 8 driving bits among the total 512 cipher bits, have the avalanche
effect and need to be particularly protected. This advantage will be shown, in our following
experiment, to be extremely important for the secure communications under strong channel
noise.
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND COMPARISONS OF STCC AND AES
Now we come to the central part of the present paper: the experimental realization of
STCC and the experimental comparisons between STCC and AES for robustness against
channel noise. We have realized a duplex voice communication by using the Public Switched
Telephone Network wired(PSTN). The scheme of the experimental set is presented in Fig.3,
where the following significant points should be emphasized.
(i) In Fig.3 we use embedded CPUs connecting to other communication tools. These
CPUs perform cryptographic operations as well as other communication tasks. Since the
embedded CPU technique has been widely used in practical communications, the experi-
mental set of Fig.3 is realistic for applications.
(ii) We use the realistic PSTN for practicing secure communications. Moreover, we
intentionally add strong noise into the transmission channel to study the possibility of se-
cure communications in wireless telephone systems where the channel noise is usually much
stronger than the wired ones.
(iii) For the cryptographic part of the experimental secure communications, we apply
both STCC and AES, respectively, for comparisons. In order to strengthen the resistance of
the communications against channel noise, we add some additional bits in Channel Coding,
for protecting the driving signals of both STCC and AES systems.
All the above arrangements are closely related to practice realistic secure communication
service.
For the channel environment we assume additive white Gaussion noise, which yields
certain fixed bit error rate (BER) of each transmitted bit. Therefore, we will directly vary
error probability p of the transmitted signal bits to model the noise perturbation in the
channel. Moreover, for the voice transmission from User A to User B we introduce BER
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before the part of ”Modulation” of User A in Fig.3 rather than after ”Modulation” in the
channel, for the sake of convenience of experimental performances and measurements. This
arrangement does not change any essence since we are interested only on the influence of
different cryptographies not Modulation and Demodulation operations.
In the part of Channel Coding we apply the standard approach of bit-error correction [19].
In case of AES, for transmitting a block of 128 cipher bits we actually transmit 136 total
bits, of which 8 additional noncipher bits are used for correcting one bit error among the all
136 transmitted bits19. The efficiency of the signal transmission is thus reduced by 6% (i.e.,
6% transmitted bits do not contain plaintext information). This bit protection fails when
two or more than two error bits appear in a single block of ciphertext. In case of STCC,
we protect the driving bits Dn only, and leave other cipher bits Sn(j1, j2) unprotected. For
transmitting 512 ciphertext bits in each iteration, we add 20 additional bits to protect the
8 driving bits. This protection can correct maximum 5 error bits in 28 bits19. With this
driving bit protection the efficiency of the signal transmission is reduced by about 4%.
Before the experiment of secure communication, we first examine the behaviors of normal
nonsecure (without cryptography) communication (NNC) with various BER p’s. The work-
ing qualities of NNC for different ranges of noise can be ranked subjectively and roughly
by ears as: excellent for p . 1
250
; fairly well for 1
250
< p . 1
100
; bad for 1
100
< p . 1
30
;
complete failure of voice communication for p > 1
30
. Therefore, we will compare the results
of cryptographies of STCC and AES, in the range of p, 1
2000
≤ p ≤ 1
10
.
In Fig.4(a) we plot pN , pS and pA vs BER probability p without bit protection, where
pN , pS and pA are the bit error rates of NNC, STCC and AES secure communications,
respectively. We have pN ≈ p for all p values. This is reasonable since the ”Modulation”
and ”Demodulation” functions in Fig.3 do not observably change the channel BER. Both
pS and pA are much larger than pN due to the error propagation effects (note, pS,A ≈ 0.5
implies/complete loss of the transmitted information). It is observed that pS and pA are in
the same order. Without bit protection pS is slightly larger than pA, indicating that STCC
has larger bit error propagation rate than that of AES.
In Fig.4(b) we do the same as Fig.4(a) except that pS and pA are measured with the
function of bit error correction operating in Channel Coding and Decoding parts. With the
designed bit protections both pS and pA become considerably smaller than those in Fig.4(a).
For STCC it is striking that the bit errors of the received plaintext are reduced so much that
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pS is almost identical to pN for p .
1
30
. This indicates that with the driving bit protection,
the secure communication based on STCC can work as good as NNC without suffering
from the bit error avalanche effect, whenever the normal communication works. To our
knowledge, it is the first time that a highly secure system has such strong resistance against
channel noise. In comparison, AES has much weaker resistance against channel noise. pA
is considerably larger than pS for all range of p ≥
1
2000
. From the figure we anticipate that
with AES secure communications with the designed bit error correction function fail at p
of order 10−2, at which NNC and STCC may still work. This distinction is significant in
practice because wireless communications may encounter channel noise close to this range.
As an example we transmit a female voice ”welcome” by applying the experiment set of
Fig.3. The input signal shown in Fig.5(a) is measured at gate G3 of Fig.3, while the output
signals are measured at gate G4 of Fig.3. Figures 5(b) and (c) show the results without
cryptography and with channel bit error rates p = 1
100
and 1
30
, respectively. The characteristic
features of the input are kept in the output even as BER is up to p = 1
30
. In Figs.5(d) and
(e) we do the same as (b) and (c), respectively, by including STCC cryptography and the
error correction of driving bits (20 additional bits for 512 ciphertext bits). There are almost
no observable deviations between STCC and NNC for both p’s. In Fig.5(f) and (g) we do
the same as (b) and (c), respectively, by including AES cryptography and the corresponding
transmitted bit protection (8 additional bits for a block of 128 ciphertext bits). In sharp
contrast, the characteristics of the input signal are essentially lost in (f) at p = 1
100
and
completely lost in (g) at p = 1
30
. From the experimental results of Figs.4 and 5 it is
concluded that STCC can work much better than AES under strong channel noise.
If we set an extremely small mismatch of the encryption and decryption keys for STCC,
e.g., b1 = a1 + 2
−52, we observe complete loss of the transmitted information (pure noise)
even if the channel noise is zero (p = 0 ). This confirms the high key-sensitivity as well as
high security of STCC. This sensitivity is also observed for AES experiment.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In conclusion we have suggested a cryptosystem which basically uses analytical floating-
point computation and auxiliarily incorporates some algebraic operations into the basic
chaotic dynamics. These combinative applications of chaotic and conventional cryptographic
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methods fully develop the advantages of the chaotic crytography and overcome its disadvan-
tages, and thus achieve optimal overall cryptographic properties of high security, fast perfor-
mance speed, and strong resistance against channel noise and other instabilities, which are
considerably better than separative applications of both chaotic and conventional cryptosys-
tems known so far, including AES. We have carried out an experiment practicing duplex
voice secure communications in the wired PSTN. By intentionally increasing channel noise
we have examined the possibility of highly secure communications in the environment of
strong channel noise. It is experimentally confirmed that our chaotic cryptosystem works
satisfactorily whenever normal nonsecure communication successfully works. In a range of
strong channel noise (p ≈ 10−2) assumed to be encountered by some wireless communica-
tions, our system can satisfactorily perform the tasks of secure communications while AES
fails to work for the same bit transmission efficiency.
This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under
10175010 and by Nonlinear Science Project.
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Captions of Figures
Fig.1. Scheme of STCC encryption. The system is constructed with a 1D chain of length
14 and a 2D 4 × 4 network. In the 1D chain the six empty triangles (∆) represent maps
with the key parameters a1, a2, and a3; the black triangle (N) performs modulo and S-box
operations Eq.(1b); and the seven empty circles (©) are used for coupling the side sites of
the 2D network. All the square sites () in the 2D network perform encryption operations
Eq.(1f) simultaneously, among which the site (4,4) (black square ) produces driving signal
Dn according to Eqs.(1f) and (1a). All the solid arrows (→) denote coupling directions; K,
I, and S indicate the keystream, plaintext, and ciphertext, respectively.
Fig.2. (a), (b) Error function e(1, 1; b1) defined in Eq.(5) vs the decryption key parameter
b1 with different b1 detection resolutions. T = 10
8. b2 = b3 = a2 = a3. We observe
e(1, 1; b1) = 0 for b1 = a1, and e(1, 1; b1) ≃
1
3
whenever b1 has any mismatch from a1 equal to
or larger than 2−45. (c) e(1, 1; b1, b2) plotted in the b1 − b2 plan. b3 = a3. (d) e(1, 1; b1, b2, b3)
presented in the (b1, b2, b3) space. A mesh is plotted black if e < 0.333, and left blank
otherwise. With 2−45 resolution, only a single black mesh is observed at b1 = a1, b2 = a2,
and b3 = a3.
Fig.3 Scheme of duplex secure speech communication experimental system. User A and
user B are talking over secure telephones. User A talks through A’s Microphone, which
produces analog speech signal. A’s Analog to Digital Converter (AD) converts the analog
speech into 128Kbit/s digital speech stream (8K samples a second, 16 bits a sample). A’s
Source Coder compresses the digital speech into 8Kbit/s redundancy discarded speech ac-
cording to a lossy speech coding standard ITU-T G.729 [20]. (Compression is needed here
so that a 33.6Kbit/s channel can transmit it). A’s Encryption unit encrypts the compressed
speech plaintext into ciphertext by using STCC and AES systems. A’s Channel Coder codes
the ciphertext into an error correct code steam [19]. Then a modem modulates the digital
code stream into analog signal, and send the signal to PSTN System. User B receives the
transmitted signal via PSTN and the inverse processing.
Fig.4 The error bit rates pN (squares , for NNC), pS (circles ©, for STCC), and pA
(triangles △, for AES), plotted vs the error bit rate in the noisy transmission channel noise
p. pN,S,A are computed by comparing the output signals measured at gate G2 with the input
signal measured at gate G1. All plots are obtained by averaging ten measurements with each
measurement taking 4Mbits. The vertical bars denote fluctuation ranges. (a) All pN,S,A are
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measured without bit error correction. (b) pS,A are measured with bit error correction while
pN not. pS is approximately equal to pN for p ≤
1
30
while pA > pN,S for p ≥
1
2000
.
Fig.5 Analyses of the experimental data of speech signal English word ”welcome” said by
a female speaker. (a) Input signal taken from gate G3 of Fig.3. (b)-(g). Received signals
taken from gate G4 of Fig.3. (b), (c) Received signals with NNC and without bit error
correction; (d), (e) with STCC and with bit error correction; (f), (g) with AES and with
bit error correction. p = 1
100
for (b), (d), (f) and p = 1
30
for (c), (e), (g). In each figure the
top panel shows speech signal waveform with horizontal coordinate axis representing time
of 0.45 second and vertical axis the amplitude of the waveform (the largest amplitude of the
input signal is normalized to one); the bottom panel presents pitch (or say, tone of speech)
in f − t plane with f being the pitch frequency and t time when the pitch is taken with the
analysis window of 0.01 second.
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